WHY YOU SHOULDN'T CITE FEDERAL STATUTES AS AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTING YOUR RIGHTS
Related Articles:
  1. PDF Enumeration of Inalienable Rights, Form #10.002 (OFFSITE LINK) - SEDM Forms page
  2. PDF Why Statutory Civil Law Is Law For Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037 (OFFSITE LINK) - SEDM Forms page
  3. PDF Federal Jurisdiction, Form #05.018 (OFFSITE LINK) - SEDM Forms page
  4. PDF Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a "Public Officer" for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008 (OFFSITE LINK) - SEDM Forms page
  5. Federal Enforcement Authority Within States of the Union, Form #05.032 (OFFSITE LINK) -proves that the only thing that the federal government has civil jurisdiction over within a state are its own property and offices and NOT private human beings.

SOURCE: Great IRS Hoax, section 4.2.6


Nearly all federal civil law is a civil franchise that you must volunteer for.  This is covered in:

Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037
http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm

As such:

  1. One must be domiciled or resident on federal territory to invoke federal civil statutory law.  State citizens domiciled in constitutional states of the Union do NOT satisfy this criteria.
  2. One must consent to the statutory “citizen” or “resident” franchise by describing themselves as such on government forms.
  3. If you are a state citizen domiciled in a constitutional state of the Union and you cite federal statutory law as authority for an injury, then indirectly you are:
    3.1.     Misrepresenting your status as as a statutory “citizen of the United States” under federal law.
    3.2.     Conferring civil jurisdiction to a federal court that they would not otherwise lawfully have.
    3.3.     Waiving sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. Chapter 97, section 28 U.S.C. 1603(b)(3).

There are exceptions to the above, but they are rare.  Any enactment of Congress that implements a constitutional provision, for instance, would be an exception.  For instance, the civil rights found mainly in Title 42, Chapter 21 entitled “Civil Rights” implement the Fourteenth Amendment.  They do not CREATE “privileges” or “rights”, but rather enforce them as authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5.  This is revealed in the following document:

Section 1983 Litigation, Litigation Tool #08.008
http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm

Federal civil rights laws are found mainly in Title 42, Chapter 21  entitled “Civil Rights”.  The most often cited statute within Chapter 21 is 42 U.S.C. 1983.  To wit:

TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 21 > SUBCHAPTER I > Sec. 1983.

Sec. 1983. - Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person [not “man” or “woman”, but “person”] who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia

The first thing to notice about the above, is that they use the word “person” instead of “man or woman”.  This “person” is a CONSTITUTIONAL person described in the Fourteenth Amendment, not a STATUTORY “person” domiciled or resident on federal territory and subject to the GENERAL jurisdiction of the national government.  The phrase “within the jurisdiction” above means the SUBJECT MATTER jurisdiction and not the GENERAL jurisdiction.  How do we know this?  Because:

  1. They mention the laws of a State or territory or the District of Columbia RATHER than those of the national government.
  2. The statute may ONLY be enforced against officers of constitutional states depriving those under their protection of their constitutionally guaranteed rights.  It may NOT be enforced against ANY private person.
"Title 42, 1983 of the U.S. Code provides a mechanism for seeking redress for an alleged deprivation of a litigant’s federal constitutional and federal statutory rights by persons acting under color of state law."
[Section 1983 Litigation, Litigation Tool #08.008, p. 1;
FORMS PAGE: http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm]

On the opposite end of the spectrum, we have civil franchises such as Social Security, Medicare, marriage licenses, driver licenses, all of which require you to volunteer by filling out an application and using government property before you are treated as a statutory “person”, “taxpayer”, “spouse”, “citizen”, or “resident”.  This is covered in:

Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030
http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm

You will find out later that the status of being either a STATUTORY “citizen” or STATUTORY “resident” within a franchise is not a status you want to have under federal law, because that is how you become a “taxpayer”!  They also use the word “State”, which we know from 4 U.S.C. 110(d) means a federal State, which is a territory or possession of the United States.  States of the Union do NOT fit this category, folks!

A very important aspect of natural rights is the following fact:

“You don’t need stinking federal statutes to protect them!”
[Family Guardian Fellowship]

Below is an example of a sovereign indian tribe that sued a state official under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 1983  and yet tried to assert that it was “sovereign”.  The U.S. Supreme Court admitted that it could NOT cite this statute as authority:

The issue pivotal here is whether a tribe [which enjoys “sovereign immunity” from suit] qualifies as a claimant -- a "person within the jurisdiction" of the United States -- under 1983.{5}  The United States maintains it does not, invoking the Court's "longstanding interpretive presumption that `person' does not include the sovereign," a presumption that "may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary."  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7-8 (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780-781 (2000)); see Will, 491 U.S. at 64.  Nothing in the text, purpose, or history of 1983, the Government contends, overcomes the interpretive presumption [538 U.S. 710] that "`person' does not include the sovereign."  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7-8 (some internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, the Government urges, given the Court's decision that "person" excludes sovereigns as defendants under 1983, it would be anomalous for the Court to give the same word a different meaning when it appears later in the same sentence.  Id. at 8; see Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (the "presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute" is "surely at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence"); cf. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 397 (1978) (because municipalities are "persons" entitled to sue under the antitrust laws, they are also, in principle, "persons" capable of being sued under those laws).

The Tribe responds that Congress intended 1983 "to provide a powerful civil remedy `against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.'"  Brief for Respondents 45 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-701 (1978)).  To achieve that remedial purpose, the Tribe maintains, 1983 should be "broadly construed."  Brief for Respondents 45 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 684-685) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Indian tribes, the Tribe here asserts, "have been especially vulnerable to infringement of their federally protected rights by states."  Brief for Respondents 42 (citing, inter alia, The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867) (state taxation of tribal lands); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (state infringement on tribal rights to hunt, fish, and gather on ceded lands); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (state attempt to regulate gambling on tribal land)).  To guard against such infringements, the Tribe contends, the [538 U.S. 711] Court should read 1983 to encompass suits brought by Indian tribes.

As we have recognized in other contexts, qualification of a sovereign as a "person" who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends not "upon a bare analysis of the word `person,'" Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 317 (1978), but on the "legislative environment" in which the word appears, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161 (1942).  Thus, in Georgia, the Court held that a State, as purchaser of asphalt shipped in interstate commerce, qualified as a "person" entitled to seek redress under the Sherman Act for restraint of trade.  Id. at 160-163.  Similarly, in Pfizer, the Court held that a foreign nation, as purchaser of antibiotics, ranked as a "person" qualified to sue pharmaceuticals manufacturers under our antitrust laws.  Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 309-320; cf. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 787, and n. 18 (deciding States are not "person[s]" subject to qui tam liability under the False Claims Act, but leaving open the question whether they "can be `persons' for purposes of commencing an FCA qui tam action" (emphasis deleted)); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213 (2001) ("Although we generally presume that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning, the presumption is not rigid, and the meaning of the same words well may vary to meet the purposes of the law." (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).

There is in this case no allegation that the County lacked probable cause or that the warrant was otherwise defective.  It is only by virtue of the Tribe's asserted "sovereign" status that it claims immunity from the County's processes.  See App. 97-105, 1-25, 108-110, 33-39; 291 F.3d at 554 (Court of Appeals "find[s] that the County and its agents violated the Tribe's sovereign immunity when they obtained and executed a search warrant against the Tribe and tribal [538 U.S. 712] property." (emphasis added)).  Section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, see Will, 491 U.S. at 66, not to advance a sovereign's prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation.  For example, as the County acknowledges, a tribal member complaining of a Fourth Amendment violation would be a "person" qualified to sue under 1983.  See Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 7.  But like other private persons, that member would have no right to immunity from an appropriately executed search warrant based on probable cause.  Accordingly, we hold that the [sovereign] Tribe may not sue under 1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims.{6}”
[Inyo County, California v. Paiute Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003)]

State courts are the only appropriate forum in which to litigate to protect your rights if you live in a state of the Union and not on federal property.  The Supreme Court confirmed this when it said:

“It would be the vainest show of learning to attempt to prove by citations of authority, that up to the adoption of the recent Amendments [the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment], no claim or pretense was set up that those rights depended on the Federal government for their existence or protection, beyond the very few express limitations which the Federal Constitution imposed upon the states—such as the prohibition against ex post facto laws, bill of attainder, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts.  But with the exception of these and a few other restrictions, the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the states, as above defined, lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the states, and without that of the Federal government.  Was it the purpose of the 14th Amendment, by the simple declaration that no state should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the states to the Federal government?  And where it is declared that Congress shall have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the states?

We are convinced that no such result was intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the states, which ratified them.

Having shown that the privileges and immunities relied on in the argument are those which belong to citizens of the states as such, and that they are left to the state governments for security and protection, and not by this article placed under the special care of the Federal government, we may hold ourselves excused from defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which no state can abridge, until some case involving those privileges may make it necessary to do so.” 
[Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36; 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873), emphasis added]

When properly litigated in a state court, the only authority necessary for the defense of rights is the Constitution itself and proof of your domicile in a state of the Union and not on federal property.  The Supreme Court alluded to this fact when it stated:

“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve that high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.” 
[Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137; 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)]

Those citing EXCLUSIVELY the constitution do not NEED federal statutes, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court:

The design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved significant also in maintaining the traditional separation of powers 524*524 between Congress and the Judiciary. The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has had primary authority to interpret those prohibitions. The Bingham draft, some thought, departed from that tradition by vesting in Congress primary power to interpret and elaborate on the meaning of the new Amendment through legislation. Under it, "Congress, and not the courts, was to judge whether or not any of the privileges or immunities were not secured to citizens in the several States." Flack, supra, at 64. While this separation-of-powers aspect did not occasion the widespread resistance which was caused by the proposal's threat to the federal balance, it nonetheless attracted the attention of various Members. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1064 (statement of Rep. Hale)  (noting that Bill of Rights, unlike the Bingham proposal, "provide[s] safeguards to be enforced by the courts, and not to be exercised by the Legislature"); id., at App. 133 (statement of Rep. Rogers) (prior to Bingham proposal it "was left entirely for the courts . . . to enforce the privileges and immunities of the citizens"). As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing. Cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 325  (discussing Fifteenth Amendment). The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.
[City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)]

Nearly all federal statutes dealing with the protection of so-called “rights” exist for the following reasons.  And by “rights” we really mean franchise privileges:

  1. They only apply within federal jurisdiction and on federal land, where the Bill of Rights do not apply and where federal jurisdiction is exclusive and plenary. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). These statutes are therefore  meant as a substitute for the Bill of Rights that only applies in federal areas.
  2. They are intended to be used by “persons” domiciled on federal territory wherever situated and may only be invoked by nonresident parties where a specific extraterritorial subject matter issue enumerated in the Constitution is involved, such as interstate commerce.
  3. The result of persons citing federal statutes who are domiciled in Constitutional states of the Union is that these people basically are volunteering or "electing" to become "resident" parties and/or “taxpayers” for the purposes of the dispute.  Keep in mind that if you are a Constitutional and not statutory "citizen", then making such an election is a CRIME pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 911!

Per Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5, 42 U.S.C. 1981 implements the equal protection provisions of said amendment as follows:

TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 21 > SUBCHAPTER I > Sec. 1981.

Sec. 1981. - Equal rights under the law

(a) Statement of equal rights

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

The whole chapter 21 only applies to people “within the jurisdiction of the United States”, which we already said are CONSTITUTIONAL and NOT federal STATUTORY "persons".  If you are domiciled within a state of the Union and don’t matinain a domicile on federal territory, then that doesn’t include you, amigo!  By “like”, they mean the same “taxes” as “U.S. citizens” pay who were born in federal territories or possessions or the District of Columbia.  Notice they put “punishment, pains, penalties, and taxes” in the same sentence because they are all equivalent!

"A fine is a tax for doing something wrong. A tax is a fine for doing something right."

Here is some more evidence:

TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 21 > SUBCHAPTER IX > 2000h–4

2000h–4. Construction of provisions not to exclude operation of State laws and not to invalidate consistent State laws

Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.

It’s silly to go to such great lengths to free yourself of federal taxes by spending countless hours reading and studying and applying this book if you are going to turn right around and call on Uncle [Big Brother] to protect you from people in your own state!  If you want to be sovereign, you can’t depend on Big Brother for anything, because the minute you start doing so, they [the IRS goons in this case] are going to come knocking on your door and ask you to “pay up”!  People who are sovereign look out for themselves and don’t take handouts or help from anyone, folks!