Case Cites Denouncing the Claim that Subtitle A Federal Income Taxes Only Apply Inside the Federal Zone
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The following list of cites from federal courts appears on the website at:

http://www.adl.org/mwd/suss5.asp#federal

It was prepared by a law librarian, Bernard J. Sussman.  It lists a number of federal court cases that allegedly invalidate the proposition that Subtitle A federal income taxes only apply inside of the federal zone or federal areas.  We haven't verified or validated these cites, but provide them for your research and further study.  The important thing we want you to note is the following:

  1. Only supreme Court cites can be cited as precedent applying to more than one taxpayer or citizen by the IRS' own Internal Revenue Manual, Section 4.10.7.2.9.8.  This therefore rules out most of the cites below and especially those from Tax Court, which is an Article I court that only has jurisdiction inside the federal zone.
  2. There are no Supreme Court cites below where the U.S. Supreme court actually ruled on this issue.  In all cases, the cert was denied.  A cert denied means absolutely nothing and certainly doesn't imply that the supreme court agrees with the rulings of the lower court.  Appeals are a privilege not a right.

We agree with Mr. Sussman that Subtitle A of the I.R.C. can apply outside the "federal zone".  However, it  may not lawfully apply to persons domiciled or resident on other than federal territory, or to persons who are not "abroad" as used in 26 U.S.C. 911, as the following authorities show:

  1. 26 U.S.C.7601 authorizes the IRS can only enforce within "internal revenue districts", and pursuant to Treasury Order 150-02, the only remaining internal revenue district is in the District of Columbia.
  2. The term "United States" is statutorily defined as including only the District of Columbia, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) and (a)(10).  Nowhere are states of the Union who are not federal territories listed in this definition or in the definition of "State" found in the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. 110(d).  The rules of statutory construction state that when words are defined in statutes, the definition supersedes and not enlarges the common definition of the term.  See our free pamphlet below for exhaustive treatment of this scam:

    Meaning of the Words 'includes' and 'including
    http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/FalseRhetoric/Includess.pdf

  3. 26 U.S.C. 911 authorizes a tax upon "trade or business" (public office) activities of government employees when abroad, for instance.  This provision of law, however, doesn't apply to American Nationals domiciled in a state of the Union who are not "effectively connected with a trade or business".  NOWHERE within the I.R.C. is taxable income ever connected to "U.S. persons" who are not abroad, or who are domestically situated in either the federal zone or a state of the Union, which means they owe NOTHING.
  4. All income taxes are based upon "domicile" and you can have a domicile in the District of Columbia without living there.  For a person domiciled in a state of the Union, all he needs to do to change his domicile to the District of Columbia is file the WRONG tax form, the IRS form 1040, which the IRS Published Products Catalog, Document 7130 says may only be used by "citizens" and residents", who both have in common a domicile in the "United States", which 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) defines as the District of Columbia.  A statutory citizen within the I.R.C. is mutually exclusive to the "citizen" described in the Constitution.  See:
  5. I.R.C. Subtitle A is an excise tax upon "trade or business", which is defined in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(26) as "the functions of a public office". Since this is an activity that is not tied to a specific geographical location, it can occur ANYWHERE that Congress specifically authorizes.  4 U.S.C. 72 says that ALL PUBLIC OFFICES shall be exercised in the District of Columbia and not elsewhere except as "expressly provided by law".  Since Congress never authorized and CANNOT authorize public offices where it has no legislative jurisdiction, then it cannot tax within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state of the Union.  You will note that the term "legislation" includes the Internal Revenue Code within the cites below

    It is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike the states, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 , 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E 724, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation.“ 
    [Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
    298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936)]


    "The difficulties arising out of our dual form of government and the opportunities for differing opinions concerning the relative rights of state and national governments are many; but for a very long time this court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the taxing power of Congress does not extend to the states or their political subdivisions. The same basic reasoning which leads to that conclusion, we think, requires like limitation upon the power which springs from the bankruptcy clause. United States v. Butler, supra."
    [Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 298 U.S. 513; 56 S.Ct. 892 (1936)]


    “Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee.

    But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.
     [License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]

All of the above simply confirms that federal judges are "legislating from the bench", willfully destroying the separation of powers, and engaging in organized crime by extending "public offices" and the excise taxes associated with them to places Congress never authorized and CANNOT authorize.  Note that the income tax is a franchise, that all franchises are contracts, and that "compacts" as used below are the equivalent of contacts:

“The United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain [e.g. converting private property to a "public office"], within the limits of a State or elsewhere, except in cases where it is delegated, and the court denies the faculty of the Federal Government to add to its powers by treaty or compact.‘”
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 508-509 (1856)]

The U.S. Supreme Court also said in the License Tax Cases,  in 1866 that Congress cannot license or tax activities within states of the Union, and a "trade or business" is an activity that has a de facto license number called a Taxpayer Identification Number or a Socialist Slave Number.

“Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee.

But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.” 
[License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]

As usual, Mr. Sussman, like all the other government welfare recipients and parasites in the legal profession and public service who defend the ILLEGAL enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code, is distracting the debate away from the main issue with a "red herring" in order to perpetuate the unlawful PLUNDERING of Americans.  Instead of arguing that Congress has no jurisdiction outside the federal zone, the debate should really be focused on:

  1. Where within the Constitution is conferred upon Congress the power write legislation that applies within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state that is NOT connected with the commerce clause found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution?
  2. What enactment of Congress "expressly extends" the public offices that are the subject of the I.R.C. Subtitle A tax upon "trade or business" activities to any state of the Union?  4 U.S.C. 72 MANDATES that such a law MUST exist.
  3. How can the IRS lawfully enforce outside of an internal revenue district pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7601?  There are not internal revenue districts within the exclusive jurisdiction of any state of the Union and the ONLY remaining internal revenue district is in the District of Columbia pursuant to Treasury Order 150-02.  Furthermore, neither Congress nor the President can create internal revenue districts in places where they have no legislative jurisdiction, such as a state of the Union.

    It is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike the states, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 , 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E 724, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation.“ 
    [Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
    298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936)]

  4. How can the IRS lawfully enforce against persons other than those listed in 26 U.S.C. 6331(a), who are all federal public officers and instrumentalities?  People in states of the Union do not fit this target audience for IRS enforcement actions.  If you would like to know why I.R.C. Subtitle A is an excise tax upon government activities, and why YOU, as a private person, become a government instrumentality by signing an IRS form W-4, see the following:

    Why Your Government is Either a Thief or you are a "Public Officer" for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008

    http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyThiefOrEmployee.pdf

  5. How can the IRS lawfully enforce against persons domiciled in states of the Union who are not federal public officers or federal instrumentalities without the implementing regulations MANDATED by 44 U.S.C.  1505(a) and 5 U.S.C. 553(a)?  See:

    IRS Due Process Meeting Handout, Form #03.008
    http://sedm.org/Forms/03-Discovery/IRSDueProcMtgHandout.pdf

  6. By what authority does the federal government maintain and enforce federal franchises such as a "trade or business" against persons not domiciled on federal territory?  The Supreme Court said it is ILLEGAL and unconstitutional.  See and rebut:

    Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030
    http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf

If you would like to know the many reasons why we agree with Sussman that I.R.C. Subtitle A income taxes are NOT limited to the federal zone, see:


Tax laws apply only to "federal" areas: {NOTE: This nonsense appears to arise from a tortured reading of the definition for United States given in 26 USC sec. 3121(e), with the cranks going to dictionaries to try to prove that "includes", as used in the definition, means "only" - but the Tax Code defines "includes" very differently in 26 USC sec. 7701(c) and United States is defined in 26 USC sec. 7701(a)(9), making it clear that throughout the Tax Code, altho only some provisions apply to Samoa and Puerto Rico, they always apply to the fifty states.}  

  • Barcroft v. CIR (1/2/97) TC Memo 1997-5 app.dism (5th Cir 12/17/97) 134 F3d 369(t), 98 USTC para  50157
  • Lonsdale v. US, 919 F2d 1440 (10th Cir 1990)
  • US v. Mundt,  29 F3d 233 (6th Cir 1994) 
  • Spoelman v. Hummel (WD Mich unpub 5/26/89); 
  • US v. Freeman (D NJ unpub 1993) 71 AFTR2d 1272, 93 USTC para 50296 aff'd 16 F3d 406 cert.den 511 US 1134 ("federal courts have never accepted these arguments"); 
  • Secora v. US, 79 AFTR2d 2686 (D Neb unpub 4/18/97)  
  • US v.  Kitsos (ND IL unpub 3/28/91)
  • US v. Updegrave,  80 AFTR2d 5290 (ED Penn unpub 5/28/97), 97 USTC para  50465;
  • US v.  R.L. Keys  991 F2d 797(t) (6th Cir unpub 4/6/93) 
  • US v. Kettler  934 F2d 326(t) (10th Cir unpub 6/3/91)  
  • In re Becraft,  885 F2d 547 (9th Cir 1989) 
  • US v. Foster [& Madge] (D Minn unpub 5/27/97); 
  • Valldejuli v. US (SD Fla unpub 12/20/96) 78 AFTR2d 7492 (this argument "routinely" rejected); 
  • In re Angstadt (Bankr. ED Penn unpub 8/17/94);
  • Wesselman v. CIR  TC Memo 1996-85 (2/28/96)
  • US v. Barbara Olson,  961 F2d 221(t) (10th Cir unpub 4/14/92)
  • Eccles v. CIR  TC Memo 1995-89 (3/2/95) 
  • US v. Knudson,  959 F.Supp 1180 (D Neb 1997) (federal jurisdiction supposedly limited to DC)  
  • A.J. Barnett v. USA  5 F3d 545(t) (10th Cir unpub 9/14/93) cert. denied 510 US 1122; 
  • K.L. Anderson v. CIR, TC Memo 1998-253 (7/8/98)   
  • Powers v. CIR, TC Memo 1990-623 (12/12/90) (refuting argument that IRS can only tax in Puerto Rico and DC); 
  • In re Busby (MD Fla unpub 10/2/98) 82 AFTR2d 6924; (this argument raised in a criminal appeal was "frivolous squared" and perp was fined for frivolous appeal under a provision which had previously been applied only to civil appeals) 
  • US v. A.D. Cooper, 170 F3d 691 (7th Cir 1999) 
  • SEC v.  Zubkis (SDNY unpub 7/15/98) Fed.Sec.L.Rep para 90263 recons.den (SDNY unpub 8/21/98)  
  • Valldejull v. Social Security Admin (ND Fla unpub 12/20/94) 75 AFTR2d 607, CCH Unempl.Ins.Rep. para 14368B, (similarly for Social Security)  
  • Barcroft v. CIR (1/2/97) TC Memo 1997-5 app.dismissed (5th Cir unpub 12/17/97) 134 F3d 369(t), 81 AFTR2d 453, 98 USTC para 50157; 
  • R.S. Powers v. CIR, TC Memo 1990-623 (12/12/90)  
  • US v. Sloan,  939 F2d 499 (7th Cir 1991) (this notion is "simply wrong") cert.den 502 US 1060 
  • Ross v.  US Internal Revenue Special Agents, 793 F.Supp 180 (SD Ind 1991)  
  • US v. R.W. Collins, 920 F2d 619 (10th Cir 1990) (this argument "defies credulity"), cert.den 500 US 920
  • M.H. Cotton v. US (10th Cir unpub 10/14/94) 39 F3d 1191(t), 74 AFTR2d 6778;  
  • Richey v. Indiana Dept of State Revenue,  634 NE2d 1375(t) (Ind. Tax Ct unpub 6/3/94) ("simply impossible")
  • Spoelman v. Hummel (WD Mich unpub 5/26/89); 
  • Eckert v. Lane  678 F.Supp 773 (WD Ark 1988)
  • In re Weatherley, 169 Bankr.Rptr 555 (Bankr. E.D. Penn 1994) , 25 Bankr.Ct.Dec 1427 
  • Christensen v. Ward, 916 F2d 1462 (10th Cir 1990) cert.den 498 US 999
  • In re Wm.G. Walters, 166 Bankr.Rptr 119 (Bankr., ND Ind. 1993) , 71 AFTR2d 1047 (citing 26 USC sec. 7701(a)(10) for definition of United States); 
  • Skurdal v. USA,  74 AFTR2d 6918 (D. Mont unpub 10/20/94), ("not a resident of the District of Columbia ... not even a resident of nowhere");
  • Isaacson v.  US,  35 F3d 571(t) (9th Cir unpub 9/9/94), 74 AFTR2d 6354; 
  • Albers v. IRS,  77 AFTR2d 1234 (D. Neb unpub 2/15/96), 96 USTC para 50197 aff'd 105 F3d 662 cert.den 520 US 1221; 
  • US v. Ward,  833 F2d 1538 (11th Cir 1987), cert.den 485 US 1022; 
  • In re Shugrue,  221 Bankr.Rptr 394 (Bankr., ND Tex 1998)
  • R. Miller v. USA (ND Ohio unpub 2/6/98)
  • R. Miller v. Gallagher (ND Ohio unpub 12/17/96)
  • Wardell v. IRS  76 AFTR2d 7290 (D Ore unpub 10/20/95); 
  • US v. Weatherley  12 F.Supp.2d 469 (ED Penn 1998) , (tried to argue that he could sue the US without any sovereign immunity because he supposed that the US meant only the District of Columbia)
  • Richey v. Indiana Dept of State Revenue (Ind. Tax Ct 1994) 634 NE2d 1375;  
  • Onkka v. Herman  80 AFTR2d 6860 (D Neb unpub 9/19/97 & 10/17/97);  (tried to argue that only the [municipal] Superior Ct of DC, not a local federal court, could hear his suit against the IRS), (this argument analyzed and debunked) 
  • J.B. Smith v. US, IRS, et al. (D. Ida unpub 7/30/93); "All United States citizens, irrespective of where they reside in the US, are subject to the IRC.  All individuals are subject to federal income tax on wages." ; 
  • SEC v.  Zubkis (SDNY unpub 7/15/98) Fed.Sec.L.Rep para 90263 recons.den (SDNY unpub 8/21/98) ("Nor does the seat of govt clause, US Constitution art. I, sec. 8 clause 17, provide a limitation on the exercise of federal power under the commerce clause.  Rather this clause states that the federal govt has the full panoply of sovereign powers over those areas used for federal purposes over which states have ceded their authority.  Zubkis appears to argue that federal power can only be exercised in Washington, DC, and other federal areas but not over him in California.  This argument is frivolous.  The clause gives the federal govt power over certain geographic areas.  It does not prevent the federal govt from exercising powers under other provisions of the Constitution, such as the commerce clause, in other other geographic areas."   
  • N.J. Wilson v. US  81 AFTR2d 2240 suit dism with prejudice (D Colo unpub 8/21/98) 82 AFTR2d 6239 (D Colo unpub 5/5/98);  
  • Cox v.  CIR  99 F3d  1149(t) (10th Cir unpub 10/28/96), 78 AFTR2d 7015, 96 USTC para 50598 (tried to argue that IRS could not tax income obtained entirely in one state without interstate commerce)
  • Noah v.  CIR 153 F3d 727(t) (10th Cir unpub 7/16/98), 82 AFTR2d 5291, 98 USTC para 50567;  
  • Kinkade v. CIR, TC Memo 1999-180 (6/1/99)  (tried to argue that income is taxable only if derived from an activity dependent on a govt license or which is "detrimental to the well being of a sovereign citizen")

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Last revision: August 14, 2009 08:09 AM
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