Presumption:  Chief Weapon for Unlawfully Enlarging Federal Jurisdiction (OFFSITE LINK)-very good memorandum of law on "presumption"

presumption.  An inference in favor of a particular fact.  A presumption is a rule of law, statutory or judicial, by which finding of a basic fact gives rise to existence of presumed fact, until presumption is rebutted.  Van Wart v. Cook, Okl.App., 557 P.2d 1161, 1163.  A legal device which operates in the absence of other proof to require that certain inferences be drawn from the available evidence.  Port Terminal & Warehousing Co. v. John S. James Co., D.C.Ga., 92 F.R.D. 100, 106.

A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.  A presumption is not evidence.  A presumption is either conclusive or rebuttable.  Every rebuttable presumption is either (a) a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence or (b) a presumption affecting the burden of proof.  Calif.Evid.Code, §600.

In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by the Federal Rules of Evidence, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.  Federal Evidence Rule 301.

See also Disputable presumption; inference; Juris et de jure; Presumptive evidence; Prima facie; Raise a presumption.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1185]

Rutter Group Practice Guide-Federal Civil Trials and Evidence, paragraph 8:4993, page 8K-34:

(1) [8:4993] Conclusive presumptions affecting protected interests:  A conclusive presumption may be defeated where its application would impair a party's constitutionally-protected liberty or property interests.  In such cases, conclusive presumptions have been held to violate a party's due process and equal protection rights.  [Vlandis v. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441, 449, 93 S.Ct 2230, 2235; Cleveland Bed. of Ed. v. LaFleur (1974) 414 US 632, 639-640, 94 S.Ct. 1208, 1215-presumption under Illinois law that unmarried fathers are unfit violates process]

[Rutter Group Practice Guide-Federal Civil Trials and Evidence, paragraph 8:4993, page 8K-34]

United States Supreme Court, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)

Statutes creating permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 52 S.Ct. 358, 76 L.Ed. 772 (1932), the Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to a federal statute that created a conclusive presumption that gifts made within two years prior to the donor's death were made in contemplation of death, thus requiring payment by his estate of a higher tax. In holding that this irrefutable assumption was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive the taxpayer of his property without due process of law, the Court stated that it had ‘held more than once that a statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ Id., at 329, 52 S.Ct., at 362. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 46 S.Ct. 260, 70 L.Ed. 557 (1926); Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206, 52 S.Ct. 120, 76 L.Ed. 248 (1931). See also Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468-469, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 1245-1246, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 29-53, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1544-1557, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969). Cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 418-419, 90 S.Ct. 642, 653-654, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970).

The more recent case of Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), involved a Georgia statute which provided that if an uninsured motorist was involved in an accident and could not post security for the amount of damages claimed, his driver's license must be suspended without any hearing on the question of fault or responsibility. The Court held that since the State purported to be concerned with fault in suspending a driver's license, it *447 could not, consistent with procedural due process, conclusively presume fault from **2234 the fact that the uninsured motorist was involved in an accident, and could not, therefore, suspend his driver's license without a hearing on that crucial factor.

Likewise, in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the Court struck down, as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Illinois' irrebuttable statutory presumption that all unmarried fathers are unqualified to raise their children. Because of that presumption, the statute required the State, upon the death of the mother, to take custody of all such illegitimate children, without providing any hearing on the father's parental fitness. It may be, the Court said, ‘that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents. . . . But all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children.’ Id., at 654, 92 S.Ct., at 1214. Hence, the Court held that the State could not conclusively presume that any individual unmarried father was unfit to raise his children; rather, it was required by the Due Process Clause to provide a hearing on that issue. According to the Court, Illinois ‘insists on presuming rather than proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing . . ..’ Id., at 658, 92 S.Ct., at 1216.^FN4

FN4. Moreover, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965), the Court held that a permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That case involved a provision of the Texas Constitution which prohibited any member of the Armed Forces who entered the service as a resident of another State and then moved his home to Texas during the course of his military duty, from ever satisfying the residence requirement for voting in Texas elections, so long as he remained a member of the Armed Forces. The effect of that provision was to create a conclusive presumption that all servicemen who moved to Texas during their military service, even if they became bona fide residents of Texas, nonetheless remained nonresidents for purposes of voting. The Court held that ‘(b)y forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of nonresidence, the Texas Constitution imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ Id., at 96, 85 S.Ct., at 780. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 349-352, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1006-1008, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).

*448 The same considerations obtain here. It may be that most applicants to Connecticut's university system who apply from outside the State or within a year of living out of State have no real intention of becoming Connecticut residents and will never do so. But it is clear that not all of the applicants from out of State inevitably fall in this category. Indeed, in the present case, both appellees possess many of the indicia of Connecticut residency, such as year-round Connecticut homes, Connecticut drivers' licenses, car registrations, voter registrations, etc.; and both were found by the District Court to have become bona fide residents of Connecticut before the 1972 spring semester. Yet, under the State's statutory scheme, neither was permitted any opportunity to demonstrate the bona fides of her Connecticut residency for tuition purposes, and neither will ever have such an opportunity in the future so long as she remains a student.

[United States Supreme Court, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)]

Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907)

The Constitution did not mean to confer [upon the states] a new power or jurisdiction, but simply to regulate the effect of the acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and things within the territory." In the later case of Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 365, 366, 368, 21 L. ed. 959, 962, 963,-decided after, but at the same term as, Thompson v. Whitman,-the court, after referring to the general rule as to the presumption of jurisdiction in superior courts of general jurisdiction, said that such presumptions 'only arise with respect to jurisdictional facts concerning which the record is silent. Presumptions are only indulged to supply the absence of evidence or averments respecting the facts presumed. They have no place for consideration when the evidence is disclosed or the averment is made. When, therefore, the record states the evidence or makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will be understood to speak the truth on that point, and it will not be presumed that there was other or different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than as averred.' In the same case: 'It is a rule as old as the law, and never more to be respected than now, that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court; by which is meant until he has been duly cited to appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity wants all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and oppression, and never can be upheld where justice is justly administered.'

[Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907)]

The Schlesinger Case has since been applied many times by the lower federal courts, by the Board of Tax Appeals, and by state courts;^FN2 and none of them seem to have been **361 at any loss to understand the basis of the decision, namely, that a statute which imposes a tax upon an assumption of fact which the taxpayer is forbidden to controvert is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it cannot stand under the Fourteenth Amendment.

FN2 See, for example, Hall v. White (D. C.) 48 F.(2d) 1060; Donnan v. Heiner (D. C.) 48 F.(2d) 1058 (the present case); Guinzburg v. Anderson (D. C.) F. (2d) 592; American Security & Trust Co. et al., Executors, 24 B. T. A. 334; State Tax Commission v. Robinson's Executor, 234 Ky. 415, 28 S.W.(2d) 491 (involving a three-year period).

*326 Nor is it material that the Fourteenth Amendment was involved in the Schlesinger Case, instead of the Fifth Amendment, as here. The restraint imposed upon legislation by the due process clauses of the two amendments is the same. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 596, 51 S. Ct. 306, 75 L. Ed., 562. That a federal statute passed under the taxing power may be so arbitrary, and capricious as to cause it to fall before the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment is settled. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 542, 47 S. Ct. 710, 71 L. Ed. 1184, 52 A. L. R. 1081; Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 24-25, 36 S. Ct. 236, 60 L. Ed. 493, L. R. A. 1917D, 414, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713; Tyler v. United States, supra, 281 U. S. 504, 50 S. Ct. 356, 74 L. Ed. 991, 69 A. L. R. 758.

[. . .]

In substance and effect, the situation presented in the Hoeper Case is the same as that presented here. In the [285 U.S. 312, 327]   first place, the tax, in part, is laid in respect of property shown not to have been transferred in contemplation of death and the complete title to which had passed to the donee during the lifetime of the donor; and, secondly, the tax is not laid upon the transfer of the gift or in respect of its value. It is laid upon the transfer, and calculated upon the value, of the estate of the decedent, such value being enhanced by the fictitious inclusion of the gift, and the estate made liable for a tax computed upon that value. Moreover, under the statute the value of the gift when made is to be ignored, and its value arbitrarily fixed as of the date of the donor's death. The result is that upon those who succeed to the decedent's estate there is imposed the burden of a tax, measured in part by property which comprises no portion of the estate, to which the estate is in no way related, and from which the estate derives no benefit of any description. Plainly, this is to measure the tax on A's property by imputing to it in part the value of the property of B, a result which both the Schlesinger and Hoeper Cases condemn as arbitrary and a denial of due process of law. Such an exaction is not taxation but spoliation. 'It is not taxation that government should take from one the profits and gains of another. That is taxation which compels one to pay for the support of the government from his own gains and of his own property.' United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 17 Wall. 322, 326.

The presumption here excludes consideration of every fact and circumstance tending to show the real motive of the donor. The young man in abounding health, bereft of life by a stroke of lightning within two years after making a gift, is conclusively presumed to have acted under the inducement of the thought of death, equally with the old and ailing who already stands in the shadow of the inevitable end. And, although the tax explicitly is based upon the circumstance that the thought of death must be in impelling cause of the transfer (United [285 U.S. 312, 328]   States v. Wells, supra, 283 U.S. 118 , 51 S. Ct. 446), the presumption, nevertheless, precludes the ascertainment of the truth in respect of that requisite upon which the liability is made to rest, with the result, in the present case and in many others, of putting upon an estate the burden of a tax measured in part by the value of property never owned by the estate of in the remotest degree connected with the death which brought it into existence. Such a statute is more arbitrary and less defensible against attack than one imposing arbitrarily retroactive taxes, which this court has decided to be in clear violation of the Fifth Amendment. As said by Judge Learned Hand in Frew v. Bowers (C. C. A.) 12 F.( 2d) 625, 630:

'Such a law is far more capricious than merely retroactive taxes. Those do indeed impose unexpected burdens, but at least they distribute them in accordance with the taxpayer's wealth. But this section distributes them in accordance with another's wealth; that is a far more grievous injustice.'

To sustain the validity of this irrebuttable presumption, it is argued, with apparent conviction, that under the prima facie presumption originally in force there had been a loss of revenue, and decisions holding that particular gifts were not made in contemplation of death are cited. This is very near to saying that the individual, innocent of evasion, may be stripped of his constitutional rights in order to further a more thorough enforcement of the tax against the guilty, a new and startling doctrine, condemned by its mere statement, and distinctly repudiated by this court in the Schlesinger ( 270 U.S. 240 , 46 S. Ct. 260, 43 A. L. R. 1224) and Hoeper ( 284 U.S. 217 , 52 S. Ct. 120) Cases involving similar situations. Both emphatically declared that such rights were superior to this supposed necessity.

The government makes the point that the conclusive presumption created by the statute is a rule of substantive law, and, regarded as such, should be upheld; and decisions tending to support that view are cited. The [285 U.S. 312, 329]   earlier revenue acts created a prima facie presumption, which was made irrebuttable by the later act of 1926. A rebuttable presumption clearly is a rule of evidence which has the effect of shifting the burden of proof, Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 , 31 S. Ct. 136, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463; and it is hard to seen how a statutory rebuttable presumptions is turned from a rule of evidence into a rule of substantive law as the result of a later statute making it conclusive. In both cases it is a substitute for proof; in the one open to challenge and disproof, and in the other conclusive. However, whether the latter presumption be treated as a rule of evidence or of substantive law, it constitutes an attempt, by legislative fiat, to enact into existence a fact which here does not, and cannot be made to, exist in actuality, and the result is the same, unless we are ready to overrule the Schlesinger Case, as we are not; for that case dealt with a conclusive presumption, and the court held it invalid without regard to the question of its technical characterization. This court has held more than once that a statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 , 238, et seq., 31 S. Ct. 145; Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 , 5-6, 49 S. Ct. 215.

'It is apparent,' this court said in the Bailey Case ( 219 U.S. 239 , 31 S. Ct. 145, 151) 'that a constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct enactment. The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.'

If a legislative body is without power to enact as a rule of evidence a statute denying a litigant the right to prove the facts of his case, certainly the power cannot be made to emerge by putting the enactment in the guise of a rule of substantive law.

[285 U.S. 312, 330]   Second. The provision in question cannot be sustained as imposing a gift tax, (1) because the intent of Congress to enact the provision as an incident of the death tax and not as a gift tax is unmistakable; and (2) because, if construed as imposing a gift tax, it is in that aspect still so arbitrary and capricious as to cause it to fall within the ban of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Routen v. West, 142 F.3d 1434 C.A.Fed.,1998

This court has never treated a presumption as any form of evidence. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1037 (Fed.Cir.1992)   (“[A] presumption is not evidence.”); see also Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286, 56 S.Ct. 190, 193, 80 L.Ed. 229 (1935)  (“[A presumption] cannot acquire the attribute of evidence in the claimant's favor.”); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161, 171, 58 S.Ct. 500, 503, 82 L.Ed. 726 (1938)  (“[A] presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.”). Although a decision of this court, Jensen v. Brown, 19 F.3d 1413, 1415 (Fed.Cir.1994) , dealing with presumptions in VA law is cited for the contrary proposition, the Jensen court did not so decide.
[Routen v. West, 142 F.3d 1434 C.A.Fed.,1998]

James 1:7-8, Bible, NKJV

"For let not that man suppose [presume] that he will receive anything from the Lord; he is a double-minded man, unstable in all his ways." [James 1:7-8, Bible, NKJV]

Numbers 15:30, Bible, NKJV

"But the person who does anything presumptuously, whether he is native-born or a stranger, that one brings reproach on the LORD, and he shall be cut off from among his people."  [Numbers 15:30, Bible, NKJV]

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239:

"The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions," 

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964):

"The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions," 

Western and Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929)

Legislation declaring that proof of one fact of group of facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of an ultimate fact in issue is valid if there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is to be inferred. A prima facie presumption casts upon the person against whom it is applied the duty of going forward with his evidence on the particular point to which the presumption relates. A statute creating a presumption that is arbitrary, or that operates to deny a fair opportunity to repel it, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislative fiat may not take the place of fact in the judicial determination of issues involving life, liberty, or property. Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 , 49 S. Ct. 215, 73 L. Ed. -, and cases cited.

The mere fact of collision between a railway train and a vehicle at a highway grade crossing furnishes no basis [279 U.S. 639, 643]   for any inference as to whether the accident was caused by negligence of the railway company, or of the traveler on the highway, or of both, or without fault of any one. Reasoning does not lead from the occurrence back to its cause. And the presumption was used to support conflicting allegations of negligence. Plaintiff claimed that the engineer failed to keep a lookout ahead, that he did not stop the train after he saw the truck on the crossing, and that his eyesight was so bad that he could not see the truck in time to stop the train.

Appellee relies principally upon Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 , 31 S. Ct. 136, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463. That was an action in a court of Mississippi to recover damages for the death of a section foreman accidentally killed in that state. While engaged about his work he stood by the track to let a train pass; a derailment occurred and a car fell upon him. A statute of the state provided: '... Proof of injury inflicted by the running of the locomotives or cars of such (railroad) company shall be prima facie evidence of the want of reasonable skill and care on the part of the servants of the company in reference to such injury.' That provision was assailed as arbitrary and in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This court held it valid and said (page 43 of 219 U. S. (31 S. Ct. 138)). 'The only legal effect of this inference is to cast upon the railroad company the duty of producing some evidence to the contrary. When that is done the inference is at end, and the question of negligence is one for the jury upon all of the evidence. ... The statute does not ... fail in due process of law, because it creates a presumption of liability, since its operation is only to supply an inference of liability in the absence of other evidence contradicting such inference.' That case is essentially different from this one. Each of the state enactments raises a presumption from the fact of injury caused by the running of locomotives or cars. The Mississippi statute cre- [279 U.S. 639, 644]   ated merely a temporary inference of fact that vanished upon the introduction of opposing evidence. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Brown, 138 Miss. 39, 66, 102 So. 855 et seq.; Columbus & G. Ry. Co. v. Fondren, 145 Miss. 679, 110 So. 365. That of Georgia as construed in this case creates an inference that is given effect of evidence to be weighed against opposing testimony, and is to prevail unless such testimony is found by the jury to preponderate.

The presumption raised by section 2780 is unreasonable and arbitrary, and violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Manley v. Georgia, supra; McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 79 , 36 S. Ct. 498; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 , 31 S. Ct. 145.

LAW.COM Dictionary:

presumption.  n. A rule of law, which permits a court to assume a fact, is true until such time as there is a preponderance (greater weight) of evidence, which disproves or outweighs (rebuts) the presumption. Each presumption is based upon a particular set of apparent facts paired with established laws, logic, reasoning or individual rights. A presumption is rebuttable in that it can be refuted by factual evidence. One can present facts to persuade the judge that the presumption is not true. Examples: a child born of a husband and wife living together is presumed to be the natural child of the husband unless there is conclusive proof it is not; a person who has disappeared and not been heard from for seven years is presumed to be dead, but the presumption could be rebutted if he/she is found alive; an accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. These are sometimes called rebuttable presumptions to distinguish them from absolute, conclusive or irrebuttable presumptions in which rules of law and logic dictate that there is no possible way the presumption can be disproved. However, if a fact is absolute it is not truly a presumption at all, but a certainty.

FINDLAW.com:

presumption. "A presumption is a deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts." (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1959 [Note: now Evidence Code, § 600.].) And "a presumption (unless declared by law to be conclusive) may be controverted by other evidence, direct or indirect: but unless controverted, the jury is bound to find according to the presumption." (Code Civ. Poc., sec. 1961 [Note: now Evid. Cd, § 602 et seq.].). (bracketed information added.) In re Bauer (1889), 79 Cal. 304, 307.

The Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 301-302:

presumption.  

(a) "In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast." (F.R.Evid., Rule 301;...

(b) "In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim of defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with State law." (F.R.Evid., Rule 302;...

[The Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 301-302]

The 'Lectric Law Library's Lexicon:

presumption. For example, a criminal defendant is presumed to be innocent until the prosecuting attorney proves beyond a reasonable doubt that she is guilty. Presumptions are used to relieve a party from having to actually prove the truth of the fact being presumed. Once one party relies on a presumption, however, the other party is normally allowed to offer evidence to disprove (rebut) the presumption. The presumption is known as a rebuttable presumption. In essence, then, what a presumption really does is place the obligation of presenting evidence concerning a particular fact on a particular party.

An inference as to the existence of one fact, from the existence of some other fact, founded on a previous experience of their connexion. Or it, is an opinion, which circumstances, give rise to, relative to a matter of fact, which they are supposed to attend.

To constitute such a presumption, a previous experience of the connection between the known and inferred facts is essential, of such a nature that as soon as the existence of the one is established, admitted or assumed, an inference as to the existence of the other arises, independently of any reasoning upon the subject. It follows that an inference may be certain or not certain, but merely, probable, and therefore capable of being rebutted by contrary proof.

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)

"[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
[McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)]

Delo v. Lashely, 507 U.S. 272 (1993)

The presumption of innocence plays a unique role in criminal proceedings. As Chief Justice Burger explained in his opinion for the Court in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976): [507 U.S. 284]

The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. Long ago this Court stated:

The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.

Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).

Id. at 503. The failure to instruct the jury on the presumption may violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even when a proper instruction on the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been given. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). Whether the omission amounts to a constitutional violation in a noncapital case depends on "the totality of the circumstances," Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979). In my judgment, the instruction should always be given in a capital case.
[Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272 (1993)]

Kentuck v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979)

"We hold that, on the facts of this case, the trial court's refusal to give petitioner's requested instruction on the presumption of innocence resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
[Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979)]

Overview of Presumptions

OVERVIEW OF PRESUMPTIONS

1. A presumption is a doctrine of substantive law, not evidence.

2. In civil cases, a presumption is a temporary substitute for evidence. A party who has the burden of proof (usually the plaintiff) may invoke a presumption in lieu of evidence, and thereby survive a motion for summary judgment or direct verdict. For example, every person is presumed to be of sound mind to execute a will, so the administrator need not offer any proof of mental competency in order to probate the will.

3. In civil cases, presumptions allocate the burden of proof. For example, there is a presumption that a death is not suicide, and a presumption that a fire is of natural origin. Therefore, an insurance company seeking to avoid paying a claim would have to prove suicide or arson, regardless of which party is nominally the plaintiff.

4. The law varies on what happens if the opposing party comes forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. In some cases, the presumption then vanishes entirely; in others, the presumption is thought to be so universally true that it remains in the case as evidence that may be considered by the jury. The specific procedural details of individual presumptions vary considerably.

5. If the opponent fails to present evidence rebutting the presumption, the presumption usually becomes conclusive and the jury will be instructed that it must consider the fact to be true.

6. In criminal cases, presumptions are controlled by the constitutional principle that the state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A presumption that relieved the prosecution of this burden would be unconstitutional, so presumptions in criminal cases are always permissive and never mandatory. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). The court should instruct the jury that it may, but does not have to, use the presumption.

Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976)

Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the three-judge court certified the class and held that the second sentence of § 131(11) and the supporting provision of 18 NYCRR § 385.7 were unconstitutional. Injunctive relief followed. The court found that § 131(11) created [424 U.S. 582] a "rebuttable presumption" that an applicant who voluntarily terminated his employment did so for a wrongful purpose. Relying upon decisions of this Court holding that presumptions are permissible unless they are unreasonable, arbitrary, or invidiously discriminatory, see, e.g., Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), the court held the rebuttable presumption irrational in violation of the Due Process Clause.

[T]here is an insufficient connection between the known fact, that is, application for public assistance within 75 days of an applicant's termination of employment, and the fact presumed by the statute, that is, that the applicant terminated his employment for the purpose of qualifying for public assistance.

First, it found that the limits of relief were so low that no substantial number of people would leave work merely to obtain welfare benefits. Second, it determined that the poor have "the same desire to work and to obtain the fruits of work as the non-poor." Although the court recognized that the presumption could be rebutted, it found that the fair hearing procedure of New York took so long -- frequently in excess of 75 days -- that it was "meaningless," in that even a determination favorable to the applicant would usually come after the 75-day penalty period had passed.

[Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976)]

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)

In so holding, we necessarily reject the Government's assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government. We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 587. Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (it was "the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty"); Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (The war power "is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme cooperative effort to preserve the nation. But even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties"). Likewise we have made clear that unless Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check on the Executive's discretion in the realm of detentions. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 ("At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest"). Thus, while we do not question that our due process assessment must pay keen attention to the particular burdens faced by the Executive in the context of military action, it would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his government simply because the Executive opposes making available such a challenge. Absent suspension of the writ by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to this process.

Because we conclude that due process demands some system for a citizen detainee to refute his classification, the proposed "some evidence" standard is inadequate. Any process in which the Executive's factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short. As the Government itself has recognized, we have utilized the "some evidence" standard in the past as a standard of review, not as a standard of proof. Brief for Respondents 35. That is, it primarily has been employed by courts in examining an administrative record developed after an adversarial proceeding -- one with process at least of the sort that we today hold is constitutionally mandated in the citizen enemy combatant setting. See, e.g., St. Cyr, supra; Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-457. This standard therefore is ill suited to the situation in which a habeas petitioner has received no prior proceedings before any tribunal and had no prior opportunity to rebut the Executive's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.

Today we are faced only with such a case. Aside from unspecified "screening" processes, Brief for Respondents 3-4, and military interrogations in which the Government suggests Hamdi could have contested his classification, Tr. of Oral Arg. 40, 42, Hamdi has received no process. An interrogation by one's captor, however effective an intelligence-gathering tool, hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate factfinding before a neutral decisionmaker. Compare Brief for Respondents 42-43 (discussing the "secure interrogation environment" and noting that military interrogations require a controlled "interrogation dynamic" and "a relationship of trust and dependency" and are "a critical source" of "timely and effective intelligence") with Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 617-618 ("one is entitled as a matter of due process of law to an adjudicator who is not in a situation which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge . . . which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true" (internal quotation marks omitted)). That even purportedly fair adjudicators "are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided is, of course, the general rule." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927). Plainly, the "process" Hamdi has received is not that to which he is entitled under the Due Process Clause.

There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal. Indeed, it is notable that military regulations already provide for such process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be made available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner of war status under the Geneva Convention. See Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army Regulation 190-8, § 1-6 (1997). In the absence of such process, however, a court that receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy combatant must itself ensure that the minimum requirements of due process are achieved. Both courts below recognized as much, focusing their energies on the question of whether Hamdi was due an opportunity to rebut the Government's case against him. The Government too proceeded on this assumption, presenting its affidavit and then seeking that it be evaluated under a deferential standard of review based on burdens that it alleged would accompany any greater process. As we have discussed, a habeas court in a case such as this may accept affidavit evidence like that contained in the Mobbs Declaration so long as it also permits the alleged combatant to present his own factual case to rebut the Government's return. We anticipate that a District Court would proceed with the caution that we have indicated is necessary in this setting, engaging in a factfinding process that is both prudent and incremental. We have no reason to doubt that courts faced with these sensitive matters will pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that might arise in an individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.

[Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)]

United States v. Gainly, 380 U.S. 63 (1965)

It has always been recognized that the guaranty of trial by jury in criminal cases means that the jury is to be the factfinder. This is the only way in which a jury can perform its basic constitutional function of determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 -19; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 -10 (opinion announcing judgment). And of course this constitutionally established power of a jury to determine guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with crime cannot be taken away by Congress, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part. Obviously, a necessary part of this power, vested by the Constitution in juries (or in judges when juries are waived), is the exclusive right to decide whether evidence presented at trial is sufficient to convict. I think it flaunts the constitutional power of courts and juries for Congress to tell them what "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction." And if Congress could not thus directly encroach upon the judge's or jury's exclusive right to declare what evidence is sufficient to prove the facts necessary for conviction, it should not be allowed to do so merely by labeling its encroachment a "presumption." Neither Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 , relied [380 U.S. 63, 78]   on by the Court as supporting this presumption, nor any case cited in Tot approved such an encroachment on the power of judges or juries. In fact, so far as I can tell, the problem of whether Congress can so restrict the power of court and jury in a criminal case in a federal court has never been squarely presented to or considered by this Court, perhaps because challenges to presumptions have arisen in many crucially different contexts but nevertheless have generally failed to distinguish between presumptions used in different ways, treating them as if they are either all valid or all invalid, regardless of the rights on which their use may impinge. Because the Court also fails to differentiate among the different circumstances in which presumptions may be utilized and the different consequences which will follow, I feel it necessary to say a few words on that subject before considering specifically the validity of the use of these presumptions in the light of the circumstances and consequences of their use.

In its simplest form a presumption is an inference permitted or required by law of the existence of one fact, which is unknown or which cannot be proved, from another fact which has been proved. The fact presumed may be based on a very strong probability, a weak supposition or an arbitrary assumption. The burden on the party seeking to prove the fact may be slight, as in a civil suit, or very heavy - proof beyond a reasonable doubt - as in a criminal prosecution. This points up the fact that statutes creating presumptions cannot be treated as fungible, that is, as interchangeable for all uses and all purposes. The validity of each presumption must be determined in the light of the particular consequences that flow from its use. When matters of trifling moment are involved, presumptions may be more freely accepted, but when consequences of vital importance to litigants and to the administration of justice are at stake, a more careful scrutiny is necessary. [380 U.S. 63, 79]  

In judging the constitutionality of legislatively created presumptions this Court has evolved an initial criterion which applies alike to all kinds of presumptions: that before a presumption may be relied on, there must be a rational connection between the facts inferred and the facts which have been proved by competent evidence, that is, the facts proved must be evidence which is relevant, tending to prove (though not necessarily conclusively) the existence of the fact presumed. And courts have undoubtedly shown an inclination to be less strict about the logical strength of presumptive inferences they will permit in civil cases than about those which affect the trial of crimes. The stricter scrutiny in the latter situation follows from the fact that the burden of proof in a civil lawsuit is ordinarily merely a preponderance of the evidence, while in a criminal case where a man's life, liberty, or property is at stake, the prosecution must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 96 -97. The case of Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 , is a good illustration of this principle. There Bailey was accused of violating an Alabama statute which made it a crime to fail to perform personal services after obtaining money by contracting to perform them, with an intent to defraud the employer. The statute also provided that refusal or failure to perform the services, or to refund money paid for them, without just cause, constituted "prima facie evidence" (i. e., gave rise to a presumption) of the intent to injure or defraud. This Court, after calling attention to prior cases dealing with the requirement of rationality, passed over the test of rationality and held the statute invalid on another ground. Looking beyond the rational-relationship doctrine the Court held that the use of this presumption by Alabama against a man accused of crime would amount to a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids "involuntary [380 U.S. 63, 80]   servitude, except as a punishment for crime." In so deciding the Court made it crystal clear that rationality is only the first hurdle which a legislatively created presumption must clear - that a presumption, even if rational, cannot be used to convict a man of crime if the effect of using the presumption is to deprive the accused of a constitutional right. In Bailey the constitutional right was given by the Thirteenth Amendment. In the case before us the accused, in my judgment, has been denied his right to the kind of trial by jury guaranteed by Art. III, 2, and the Sixth Amendment, as well as to due process of law and freedom from self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. And of course the principle announced in the Bailey case was not limited to rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court said in Bailey:

"It is apparent that a constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct enactment. The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions." 219 U.S., at 239 .

Thus the Court held that presumptions, while often valid (and some of which, I think, like the presumption of death based on long unexplained absence, may perhaps be even salutary in effect), must not be allowed to stand where they abridge or deny a specific constitutional guarantee. It is one thing to rely on a presumption to justify conditional administration of the estate of a person absent without explanation for seven years, see Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458 ; compare Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 ; it would be quite another to use the presumption of death from seven years' absence to convict a man of murder. I do not think it can be denied that use of the statutory presumptions in the case before [380 U.S. 63, 81]   us at the very least seriously impaired Gainey's constitutional right to have a jury weigh the facts of his case without any congressional interference through predetermination of what evidence would be sufficient to prove the facts necessary to convict in a particular case.

The Bailey case also emphatically answers the Court's insistence that this encroachment on Gainey's constitutional rights was justified or neutralized by the trial court's instruction that while evidence of unexplained presence was sufficient under the statute to convict, the jury nonetheless was not compelled to convict. This same kind of contention was made to this Court and rejected in Bailey, where the Alabama Supreme Court had upheld that State's presumption on the ground that "with such evidence before them, the jury are still left free to find the accused guilty or not guilty, according as they may be satisfied of his guilt or not, by the whole evidence." Bailey v. State, 161 Ala. 75, 78, 49 So. 886, 887. This Court answered that contention then, as I think it should now, saying:

"The point is that, in such a case, the statute authorizes the jury to convict. It is not enough to say that the jury may not accept that evidence as alone sufficient; for the jury may accept it, and they have the express warrant of the statute to accept [it] as a basis for their verdict." 219 U.S., at 235 . (Emphasis in original.)

And the Court added that "The normal assumption is that the jury will follow the statute and, acting in accordance with the authority it confers, will accept as sufficient what the statute expressly so describes." Id., at 237.

Even if I could accept the doctrine that Congress after declaring that certain conduct shall be a crime has further power to tell judges and juries that certain evidence shall be sufficient to prove that conduct and convict [380 U.S. 63, 82]   a defendant, I could not agree that these statutory presumptions are constitutional. They declare mere presence at a still site without more to be sufficient evidence to convict of the crimes of carrying on a distillery business and possessing a still. 5 While presence at a still is unquestionably a relevant circumstance to add to others to prove possession or operation of a still, I could not possibly agree that mere presence is sufficient in and of itself, without any supporting evidence, to permit a finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person present carried on a distillery business or possessed a still or even aided and abetted in committing those crimes. Indeed, with respect to the crime of possession, as the Court concedes, we held squarely to the contrary in Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 , quite properly, I think. In setting aside the Bozza conviction for possession of a still, which had been based on mere presence at a still, this Court was acting in accordance with the historic principle that "independent trial judges and independent appellate judges have a most important place under our constitutional plan since they have power to set aside convictions." United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 19 . This judicial responsibility to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence must be exercised in each case, no more to be controlled by a general congressional enactment than it could be by a special act directed to one case only. 6 This protective function of the court is amply demonstrated in the case before us: while Gainey was originally indicted on four counts. [380 U.S. 63, 83]   the trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal on one 7 and the Court of Appeals ordered acquittal on another. 8  

It indeed is true, as the Court suggests, that it was to make convictions possible on no more evidence than presence that the presumption statute here under consideration was passed. Undoubtedly a presumption which can be used to produce convictions without the necessity of proving a crucial element of the crime charged - and a sometimes difficult-to-prove element at that 9 - is a boon to prosecutors and an incongruous snare for defendants in a country that claims to require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Quite accurately such a use of a presumption has been described as "First Aid to the District Attorney." 10 Instead of supporting the constitutionality of such a use of statutory presumptions, however, I think this argument based on necessity and convenience points out its fatal defects. I suppose no one would deny that the Government's burden would also be made lighter if the defendant was not represented by counsel, compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , [380 U.S. 63, 84]   or if the jury could receive and consider confessions extorted by torture, compare Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , or if evidence obtained from defendants through illegal searches and seizures could be used against them, compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , but this Court has not hesitated to strike down such encroachments on those constitutional rights. Yet here the Court sanctions a method less crude, but just as effective, to deny Gainey his constitutional right to a trial by jury. 11  

I cannot subscribe to the idea that any one of the constitutional grants of power to Congress enumerated in Art. I, 8, including the Necessary and Proper Clause, contains either an express or an implied power of Congress to instruct juries as to what evidence is sufficient to convict defendants in particular cases. 12 Congress can [380 U.S. 63, 85]   undoubtedly create crimes, but it cannot constitutionally try them. The Constitution specifically prohibits bills of attainder. Congress can declare certain conduct a crime, unless barred by some constitutional provision, but it must, if true to our Constitution of divided powers and the Fifth Amendment's command that cases be tried according to due process of law, leave the trial of those crimes to the courts, in which judges or juries can decide the facts on their own judgment without legislative constraint and judges can set aside convictions which they believe are not justified by the evidence. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 473 (concurring opinion). "[I]t is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 . See Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 . Yet, viewed realistically, that is what the presumption which the Court today approves does in this case. I think that the presumption which should govern instead in criminal trials in the courts of this country is the time-honored presumption of innocence accorded to all criminal defendants until they are proved guilty by competent evidence.

Nor can a power of Congress to detract from the constitutional power of juries and judges to decide what facts are enough to convict be implied because of the power of Congress to make procedural rules or rules of evidence. See Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 720 . It is not disputed that Congress has power to prescribe rules governing admissibility of evidence and purely procedural matters. The Congress unquestionably could declare the fact of presence to be admissible evidence, for certainly it is relevant when considered along with other circumstances. Yet this power to say what shall or shall not be admissible in no way empowers Congress to determine what facts, once admitted, suffice to prove guilt beyond a reasonable [380 U.S. 63, 86]   doubt. 13 And I certainly cannot join the Court when it says:

"The process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly empirical, and in matters not within specialized judicial competence or completely commonplace, significant weight should be accorded the capacity of Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it."

The implication of this statement is that somehow Congress is better qualified to decide what facts are sufficient to convict defendants than are courts and juries. I accept the proposition that Congress is the proper branch of our Government to decide legislative policies and enact general laws and that in so doing it must of necessity deal with facts to some extent. This is as the Constitution provides. But Congress is not authorized nor has it any special "expertise" with which I am familiar which entitles it to direct juries as to what conclusions they may or must draw from the unique facts of specific criminal cases tried in federal courts. Moreover, even were I to assume that Congress does have an expertise to assess facts in lawsuits which is superior to that of juries and judges, I still could not join the Court's opinion, for I think that the Founders of our Government decided for us that these are matters "within specialized" - and exclusive - "judicial [380 U.S. 63, 87]   competence." As this Court has said with reference to jury trial of facts:

"whether right or wrong, the premise underlying the constitutional method for determining guilt or innocence in federal courts is that laymen are better than specialists to perform this task." United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 .

Besides impairing Gainey's right to trial by jury according to due process safeguards, the statutes in this case I think violated Gainey's constitutional rights in still another way. These statutory presumptions must tend, when incorporated into an instruction, as they were here, to influence the jury to reach an inference which the trier of fact might not otherwise have thought justified, to push some jurors to convict who might not otherwise have done so. Cf. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 15 . The undoubted practical effect of letting guilt rest on unexplained presence alone is to force a defendant to come forward and testify, however much he may think doing so may jeopardize his chances of acquittal, since if he does not he almost certainly destroys those chances. This is compulsion, which I think runs counter to the Fifth Amendment's purpose to forbid convictions on compelled testimony. The compulsion here is of course more subtle and less cruel physically than compulsion by torture, but it is nonetheless compulsion and it is nonetheless effective. I am aware that this Court in Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 , held that use of a presumptive squeeze like this one did not amount to a form of compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. The Court's reasoning was contained in a single paragraph, the central argument of which was that despite a presumption like this a defendant is left "entirely free to testify or not as he chooses." That argument, it seems to me, would also justify admitting in evidence a confession [380 U.S. 63, 88]   extorted by a policeman's pointing a gun at the head of an accused, on the theory that the man being threatened was entirely free to confess or not, as he chose. I think the holding in Yee Hem is completely out of harmony with the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination, and I would overrule it. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 494 (dissenting opinion); compare Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 . See also State v. Lapointe, 81 N. H. 227, 123 A. 692, quoted with approval in the opinion of the court below, 322 F.2d 292, 296 (C. A. 5th Cir.).

For all the foregoing reasons, I think that these two statutory presumptions by which Congress has tried to relieve the Government of its burden of proving a man guilty and to take away from courts and juries the function and duty of deciding guilt or innocence according to the evidence before them, unconstitutionally encroach on the functions of courts and deny persons accused of crime rights which our Constitution guarantees them. The most important and most crucial action the courts take in trying people for crime is to resolve facts. This is a judicial, not a legislative, function. I think that in passing these two sections Congress stepped over its constitutionally limited bounds and encroached on the constitutional power of courts to try cases. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court below and grant Gainey a new trial by judge and jury with all the protections accorded by the law of the land.

[United States v. Gainly, 380 U.S. 63 (1965)]

Copyright Family Guardian Fellowship