CITES BY TOPIC:  residence

The Residence Contract - part of Invisible Contracts by George Mercier

USCIS Policy Manual, Voume 12, Part D, Chapter 3: Continuous Residence

A Treatiise on the law of Domicile, M.W. Jacobs, Little Brown and Company, 1887, Section 75, pp. 123-124

§. 75. Id. •• "'residence" in Amenican Leigsilation generally, although not always, means "Domicile" --The word" domicil," although so often used and commented upon by our courts, is rarely to be met with in our constitutions or legislative enactments." Residence" is the favorite term employed by the
American legislator to express the connection between person and place, its exact signification being left to construction, to be determined from the context and the apparent object sought to be attained by the enactment.1 It is to be regretted that these lights are often very feeble, and that not a little confusion has been introduced into our jurisprudence by the different views held by different courts with regard to the exact force of this and similar words when applied to substantially the same subject-matter. "Residence" when used in statutes is generally construed to mean" domicil." 2 In fact, the great bulk of the cases of domicil reported in the American books are cases of statutory residence. This is especially true with regard to the subjects of voting, eligibility to office, taxation, jurisdiction in divorce, probate and administration, etc. With respect to these subjects there is substantial unanimity
in this country in holding statutory residence to mean domicil. In cases of pauper settlement, limitations, etc., there is much conflict of opinion, and in those of attachment the weight of authority is the other way.5

[A Treatiise on the law of Domicile, M.W. Jacobs, Little Brown and Company, 1887, Section 75, pp. 123-124]

[EDITOR'S NOTE: Government identity theft occurs when, in a civil proceeding, the government PRESUMES, usually falsely, that physical presence ="residence". It does NOT. See: Government Identity Theft, Form #05.046]

8 C.F.R. 316.5: Residence in the United States

[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Title 8, Volume 1]
[Revised as of January 1, 2005]
From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
[CITE: 8CFR316.5]
[Page 716-718]
Sec. 316.5  Residence in the United States.

    (a) General.

Unless otherwise specified, for purposes of this chapter, including Sec. 316.2 (a)(3), (a)(5), and (a)(6), an alien's residence is the same as that alien's domicile, or principal actual dwelling place, without regard to the alien's intent, and the duration of an alien's residence in a particular location is measured from the moment the alien first establishes residence in that location.

Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983)

A difference between the concepts of residence and domicile has long been recognized. See, e. g., Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350 (1875); Penfield v. Chesapeake, O. & S. R. Co., 134 U.S. 351 (1890); Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939). A person is generally a resident of any State with which he has a well-settled connection. "[M]ere lodging or boarding or temporary occupation" is not enough to establish a residence. Dwyer v. Matson, 163 F.2d 299, 303 (CA10 1947). See generally Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 561, 563 (1953). Under the law of Texas, for example, "[r]esidence may be temporary or permanent in nature. However, residence generally requires some condition greater than mere lodging. The term implies a place of abode, albeit temporary, rather than a mere transient lodging." Whitney v. State, 472 S. W. 2d 524, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (citation omitted). See, e. g., Brown v. Boulden, 18 Tex. 431, 432 (1857); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Mattox, 345 S. W. 2d 290, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Prince v. Inman, 280 S. W. 2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). "Intent to remain indefinitely" in the State need not be shown in order to be considered a resident of a [461 U.S. 321, 339]   State. 5 As the Texas Supreme Court stated in Snyder v. Pitts, 150 Tex. 407, 413, 241 S. W. 2d 136, 139 (1951), "[f]rom the fact that there can be but one domicile and several residences, we arrive at the conclusion that the element of `intent to make it a permanent home' is not necessary to the establishment of a second residence away from the domicile." [461 U.S. 321, 340]  

On the other hand, an individual has only one domicile, which is generally the State with which he is currently most closely connected, but which may be a State with which he was closely connected in the past. See generally Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441 (1941); Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914). Traditionally, an individual has been said to acquire a new domicile when he resides in a State with "the absence of any intention to live elsewhere," id., at 624, or with "the absence of any present intention of not residing permanently or indefinitely in' the new abode." Ibid., citing A. Dicey, The Conflict of Laws 111 (2d ed. 1908). The concept of domicile has typically been reserved for purposes that clearly require general recognition of a single State with which the individual, actually or presumptively, is most closely connected. 6  

The majority errs in assuming that, as a general matter, States are free to close their schools to all but domiciliaries of the State. To begin with, it is clear that residence, not domicile, is the traditional standard of eligibility for lower school education, 7 just as residence often has been used to determine [461 U.S. 321, 341] whether an individual is subject to state income tax, whether his property in the State is exempt from attachment, and whether he is subject to jury duty. 8 Moreover, this Court's prior decisions which speak of the constitutionality of a bona fide residence standard provide no support for the majority's assumption. Although this Court has referred to a domicile requirement with approval in the context of higher education, it is incumbent upon the State of Texas to demonstrate that the classification transplanted from another statutory scheme is justified by "`the purposes for which the state desires to use it.'" Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982), quoting Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 664 -665 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring).

[Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983)]