|TAX DEPOSITION QUESTIONS: 7. 4th AMENDMENT|
The 4th Amendment to the Constitution explicitly requires a signed court order or warrant for the Government to seize property or conduct a search.
IRS blatantly disregards the 4th Amendment in direct violation of the Constitution by administratively sending pieces of paper with titles like "Notice of Levy" (and such) to third parties (such as employers and banks) that do NOT have the legal authority of a court order.
IRS’s daily operating practices routinely, and by design, deny the average citizen due process of law to perpetuate the unlawful collection of income taxes. A tax system that violates the basic protection of due process is not constitutional.
Findings and Conclusions
With the assistance of the following questions, we will show that the IRS routinely violated Fourth Amendment due process protections of Americans by seizing assets without lawful authority or a court order. We will also show that:
Bottom Line: The 4th Amendment does not matter to the IRS.
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7.1. Admit that 26 U.S.C. §6331 is the authority by which distraint in the collection of Subtitle A income taxes against individuals is instituted. (WTP #400)
7.2. Admit that 26 U.S.C. §6331(a) identifies the only entities against whom distraint may be instituted. If there are other entities besides those in 26 U.S.C. §6331(a), so indicate the statute or regulation which identifies them. (WTP #401)
7.3. Admit that 26 U.S.C. §6331(a) identifies that levy may be made against only the following individuals: (WTP #402)
"(a)...Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected official, of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of the United States or the District of Columbia, by serving a notice of levy on the employer (as defined in section 3401(d)) of such officer, employee, or elected official."
7.4. Admit that 26 CFR §31.3401(c ) identifies the definition of "employee" as: (WTP #403)
26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(c ) Employee: "...the term [employee] includes officers and employees, whether elected or appointed, of the United States, a [federal] State, Territory, Puerto Rico or any political subdivision, thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term 'employee' also includes an officer of a corporation."
7.5. Admit that the IRS Form 668-A(c)(DO) is the Notice of Levy form routinely delivered to private, nongovernmental employers by the IRS to institute distraint against their employees. (WTP #404)
7.7. Admit that the removal of 26 U.S.C. §6331(a) from the reverse side of IRS Form 668-A(c)(DO) could lead private employers who do not employ federal "employees" to incorrectly honor a Notice of Levy. (WTP #406)
7.8. Admit that inclusion of 26 U.S.C. §6331(a) on the reverse side of the IRS Form 668-A(c)(DO) would make it less likely to cause private employers to misinterpret or misapply the law in processing an IRS Notice of Levy. (WTP #407)
7.9. Admit that the Fourth Amendment requires that all seizures of property by the U.S. government must be preceded by service of a warrant upon the party whose property is to be seized. (WTP #408)
7.10. Admit that the Fourth Amendment requires that the person who signs or issues the warrant authorizing seizure must be a neutral magistrate as indicated in the annotated Fourth Amendment found at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment04/02.html. (WTP #409)
Issuance by Neutral Magistrate .--In numerous cases, the Court has referred to the necessity that warrants be issued by a ''judicial officer'' or a ''magistrate.'' ''The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.'' These cases do not mean that only a judge or an official who is a lawyer may issue warrants, but they do stand for two tests of the validity of the power of the issuing party to so act. ''He must be neutral and detached, and he must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search.'' The first test cannot be met when the issuing party is himself engaged in law enforcement activities, but the Court has not required that an issuing party have that independence of tenure and guarantee of salary which characterizes federal judges.  And in passing on the second test, the Court has been essentially pragmatic in assessing whether the issuing party possesses the capacity to determine probable cause. 
 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979).
 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 -51 (1971) (warrant issued by state attorney general who was leading investigation and who as a justice of the peace was authorized to issue warrants); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370 -72 (1968) (subpoena issued by district attorney could not qualify as a valid search warrant); Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979) (justice of the peace issued open-ended search warrant for obscene materials, accompanied police during its execution, and made probable cause determinations at the scene as to particular items).
 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 -71 (1960) (approving issuance of warrants by United States Commissioners, many of whom were not lawyers and none of whom had any guarantees of tenure and salary); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (approving issuance of arrest warrants for violation of city ordinances by city clerks who were assigned to and supervised by municipal court judges). The Court reserved the question ''whether a State may lodge warrant authority in someone entirely outside the sphere of the judicial branch. Many persons may not qualify as the kind of 'public civil officers' we have come to associate with the term 'magistrate.' Had the Tampa clerk been entirely divorced from a judicial position, this case would have presented different considerations.'' Id. at 352.
 Id. at 350-54 (placing on defendant the burden of demonstrating that the issuing official lacks capacity to determine probable cause). See also Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (unsalaried justice of the peace who receives a sum of money for each warrant issued but nothing for reviewing and denying a warrant not sufficiently detached).
7.11. Admit that the IRS routinely seizes property from citizens without first litigating to obtain a warrant from a neutral magistrate. (WTP #410)
7.12. (CH) Admit that the Supreme Court said that persons are entitled to a due process hearing prior to the seizing of property as follows: (WTP #411)
“While "many controversies
have raged about . . . the Due Process Clause," ibid., it is fundamental
that except in emergency
situations (and this is not one)*fn5
due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest
such as that here involved, it must afford "notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case" before the termination
becomes effective. Ibid. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator,
312 U.S., at 152-156; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra; Goldberg
v. Kelly, supra; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)."
"*fn5 See, e. g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,"
7.13. (CH )Admit that the due process hearing prior to seizure must occur at the point where the seizure of property can be prevented: (WTP #412)
If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. At a later hearing, an individual’s possessions can be returned to him if they were unfairly or mistakenly taken in the first place. Damages may even be awarded him for wrongful deprivation. But no later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of due process has already occurred.
"This Court [the Supreme Court] has not embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone....
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.*fn8 Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.*fn9"
” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 556, 92 S.Ct. 1208 (1972)
7.14. Admit that 26 U.S.C. §7805(a) authorizes and empowers the Secretary of the Treasury as follows: (WTP #413)
Sec. 7805. - Rules and regulations
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.
7.15. Admit that there are no implementing regulations applicable to Part 1 of Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations which authorize assessment of the tax imposed under 26 U.S.C. §1 or 26 U.S.C. §871(b) by other than the taxpayer filling out the form. (WTP #414)
7.16. Admit that there are no implementing regulations applicable to Part 1 of Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations which require record keeping for the tax imposed under 26 U.S.C. §1 or 26 U.S.C. §871(b). (WTP #415)
7.17. Admit that there are no implementing regulations applicable to Part 1 of Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations which authorize IRS collection of the tax imposed under 26 U.S.C. §1 or 26 U.S.C. §871(b). (WTP #416)
7.18. Admit that there are no implementing regulations applicable to Part 1 of Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations which authorize imposition by the government of penalties or interest for nonpayment of the tax imposed under 26 U.S.C. §1 or 26 U.S.C. §871(b). (WTP #417)
IRS FRAUD: CREATION OF TIME BARRED ASSESSMENTS: Questions 7.19 through 7.25
7.19. Admit the IRS is placing levies on taxpayers federal social security benefits in direct violation of the law. (See 42 U.S.C. §407). (WTP #231a)
7.20. Admit the IRS is exceeding the 15% lawful restriction on collection of continuing levies. (See 26 U.S.C. §6331). (WTP #231b)
7.21. Admit that the IRS is making illegal time barred assessments and concealing those assessments by placing fraudulent information on taxpayer master files. (See 26 U.S.C. §6020(b)). (WTP #231c)
7.22. Admit that the IRS is submitting fraudulent CERTIFICATES OF OFFICIAL RECORDS to the courts to substantiate lawful assessments. (WTP #231d)
7.23. Admit that the IRS illegally transfers taxpayer payments from their master file to an account called "excess collections" for the purpose of creating fraudulent penalty and interest charges against the taxpayer. (WTP #231e)
7.24. Admit that the IRS collection division agents put accounting hold codes on taxpayers' accounting modules which forces all entry of data to be inputted manually by the agents and prevents the computer from performing the taxpayers' accounting according to its programming and according to the law. (WTP #231f)
7.25. Admit that the IRS is short-paying taxpayers' lawful interest owed to them by placing wrongful dates and codes on taxpayers' master files. (WTP #231g)
IRS VIOLATES CITIZENS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS: Questions 7.26 through 7.86
7.26 Admit that after the IRS has audited a taxpayer, and there is disagreement, the Code of Federal Regulations requires IRS to take certain procedural steps to ensure the American Citizen administrative level action for hearings on those disagreements, including an examination of the audit with the agent, followed by a meeting with the IRS' agent's supervisor, followed by a 30 day letter which sets out the IRS' disputed items with the American Citizen and an administrative appeal of the IRS' decision on the audit. (See 26 C.F.R. §601.105 and §601.106) (WTP #256a)
7.27 Admit that the purpose of these administrative steps is to afford the American an opportunity to have his disputed audit resolved at the administrative level. In other words, that these are pre-court or pre-litigation steps, which are designed to help the People avoid the expensive procedure known as Tax Court. (WTP #256b)
7.28 Admit that if the dispute is not resolved at the administrative level, the taxpayer's only affordable remedy is to petition Tax Court. (WTP #256c)
7.29 Admit that IRS Publication 1, IRS Publication 5, and IRS Publication 556, are all given to the taxpayer during the audit through appeals procedure and that these publications state that these administrative, procedural (due process) steps are available to the American Citizen. (WTP #256d)
7.30 Admit that when the People request these administrative, procedural (due process) steps, they are more often than not denied by the IRS. (WTP #256e)
7.31. Admit that Tax Court is an extremely expensive remedy for the average American. (WTP #256f)
7.32. Admit that the IRS is the only party that benefits as taxpayers are forced into Tax Court. (WTP #256g)
7.33. Admit that the Tax Court, in Minahan v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 492, ruled that the taxpayer must demand his procedural, due process rights or any right he might ever have in to obtain attorney fees in a favorable outcome of his case or else his case is automatically in jeopardy. (WTP #256h)
7.34 Admit that the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 requires an American to go through these administrative, procedural (due process) steps in order to prove his "cooperativeness" with the IRS, and to shift the burden of proof to the IRS during the administrative hearing and at trial. (See IRS RRA of 1998, Section 3001, 26 U.S.C. §7491) (WTP #256i)
7.35 Admit that the IRS routinely ignores the Peoples' demands for their procedural, due process, and statutory rights, thereby ignoring IRS publications 1, 5, 556, the regulations they are supposed to use in making their determination and the underlying statutes. (WTP #256j)
7.36 Admit that there is no penalty for IRS agents if they violate the income tax statutes by denying the People their due process rights, but the statutes contain a multitude of penalties for the People if they violate the income tax statutes, and those penalties are almost always imposed. (See Index of the IRS Tax Code, Penalties). (WTP #256k)
7.37 Admit that the IRS frequently denies persons their administrative, statutory, due process rights because the statute of limitations (26 U.S.C. 6501 et seq.) is running out for them to get the statutory Notice of Deficiency (26 U.S.C. §6212) out and they are in fear of losing the whole year of taxation from that person. (WTP #256l)
7.38. Admit that the IRS races to issue a STATUTORY NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY, 26 U.S.C. §6212, rather than give the People their due process rights to administrative level resolution required by 26 C.F.R. §601.605, 601.606, because the IRS has greater resources and power in TAX COURT than the average American. (WTP #256m)
7.39. Admit that a Notice of Deficiency is, in most cases, completely erroneous, and always greatly in favor of the IRS. (WTP #256n)
7.40. Admit that many people default on their Notice of Deficiency because they don't have the money to get to Tax Court. (WTP #256oo)
7.41. Admit that the IRS often uses erroneous figures for Income when they send out a Notice of Deficiency. (WTP #256p)
7.42. Admit that there are other ways that the IRS uses figures that it knows are false on its Notice of Deficiencies under 26 U.S.C. §6212. (WTP #256q)
7.43. Admit that the result of this the fact is that the TAXPAYER is often sent an entirely false Notice of Deficiency. (WTP #256r)
7.44 Admit that 26 U.S.C. §6211 is used to determine how a deficiency is made and it does not allow for "0" deductions when the American has claimed deductions. (WTP #256s)
7.45. Admit that the Tax Court has, however, ruled that the use of "0" line deduction in IRS issued Notices of Deficiency is permissible, even if the taxpayer has claimed deductions. (WTP #256t)
7.46. Admit that the law (26 U.S.C. §6211 Definition of Deficiency) does not permit the "bank deposit analysis" method of determining gross income of a person. (WTP #256u)
7.47. Admit that the IRS routinely issues Notices of Deficiency that are based on assessments that the IRS makes without following its own procedures and manuals. (WTP #256v)
7.48. Admit that the issuance of a Notice of Deficiency or "90 day Notice" letter is the triggering event and a person so receiving such a letter must file his case in Tax Court within 90 days or forever be held to the often totally false liability assessed in the grossly false Notice of Deficiency. (See 26 U.S.C. §6213) (WTP #256w)
7.49 Admit that this is why the administrative, statutory due process steps are so important. (WTP #256x)
7.50. Admit that the federal district court has refused to reach the merits of a claim that Tax Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in those cases where the IRS has issued Notices of Deficiency after denying the taxpayers their administrative, statutory due process rights. (WTP #256y)
7.51. Admit that the IRS Handbook for Examination of Returns reads in part: (WTP #256z)
"Examiners are responsible for determining the correct tax liability as prescribed by the Internal Revenue Code. It is imperative that examiners can identify the applicable law, correctly interpret its meaning in light of congressional intent, and, in a fair and impartial manner, correctly apply the law based on the facts and circumstances of the case. " (See IRS Internal Revenue Manual, Section 188.8.131.52)
7.52. Admit that the IRS Handbook for Examination of Returns also reads in part: (WTP #256aa)
"Conclusions reached by examiners must reflect correct application of the law, regulations, court cases, revenue rulings, etc. Examiners must correctly determine the meaning of statutory provisions and not adopt strained interpretation." (See IRS Internal Revenue Manual, Section 184.108.40.206)
7.53. Admit that when a taxpayer requests what regulations and statutes the examiner used in making his determination of tax liability, the IRS routinely refuses to cite the law in the majority of cases. (WTP #256bb)
7.54. Admit that without an assessment there can be no liability. (WTP #256cc)
7.55. Admit that some IRS disclosure officers are making the assessments. (WTP #256dd)
7.56. Admit that there is not law in which a disclosure officer is authorized to make an assessment. (WTP #256ee)
7.57. Admit that an assessment made by a disclosure officer is invalid as a matter of law. (WTP #256ff)
7.58. Admit that there are over 100 regulations that apply to Form 1040 cross referenced by OMB #1545-0074, and that the IRS refuses to identify which ones they use in making determinations that a citizen is liable to file a Form 1040 and is liable to pay the tax. (WTP #256gg)
7.59. Admit that a lien arises at the time an assessment is made (See 26 U.S.C. §6322). (WTP #256hh)
7.60 Admit that the evidence underlying the entries on the Certificate of Assessments and Payments is relevant to the issue of whether an assessment was made. [See Beall v. U.S., Civil Action 89 C 6500 (N.D. Ill. Eastern Division), which relies on Psaty v. U.S., 442 F.2d 1154 (3rd Cir. 1971), and U.S. v. Hart, 89-1 USTC para 9255 (C D Ill, 1989)]. (WTP #256ii)
7.61. Admit that without an assessment there is no liability. (WTP #256jj)
7.62. Admit that the taxpayer is helpless as he tries to exercise his statutory (due process) rights to these lower level administrative remedies to resolve his audit difference without going to tax court. (WTP #256kk)
7.63 Admit that the tax imposed upon individuals required to make a return under Section 6012(a) of the Internal Revenue Code is imposed upon the individual's "taxable income." (See 26 U.S.C. §6012(a)) (WTP #257)
7.64 Admit that the Section 6020(b) requirement for the Secretary to make the required Section 6012(a) return is to require the Secretary to compute the taxpayers taxable income so the correct amount of tax owed can be calculated [See 26 U.S.C. §6012(a) and 6020(b)] (WTP #258)
7.65 Admit that when an individual required to make a return under 26 U.S.C. §6012(a) of the I.R.C. fails to make the required return, and the Internal Revenue Service issues a notice of deficiency, the amount of tax claimed as due by the Secretary is not based upon the taxable income, but is computed without regard to the requirements of Sections 62 and 63 of the Internal Revenue Code from which adjusted gross income and taxable income are computed from gross income. [See 26 U.S.C. §62, 26 U.S.C. §63, and 26 U.S.C. §6012(a)] (WTP #259)
7.66. Admit that the IRS attempts to obtain assessments of more tax than would otherwise be required by law as an unauthorized additional penalty on those who are required to, but do not, make federal income tax returns. (See Turner Affidavit) (WTP #260)
7.67. Admit that the word "shall" as contained in 26 U.S.C. §6001 imposes a mandatory duty on those to whom the statute applies to keep records, render statements, make returns and to comply with rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury. [See 26 U.S.C. §6001] (WTP #261)
7.68. Admit that the word "shall" as contained in Section 6011 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a mandatory duty on those to whom the statue applies to make a return or statement according to the forms and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. [See 26 U.S.C. §6011] (WTP #262)
7.69. Admit that the word "shall" as contained in Section 6012 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a mandatory duty on those to whom the statute applies to make returns. (See 26 U.S.C. §6012) (WTP #263)
7.70. Admit that the word "shall" as contained in Section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a mandatory duty on those to whom the statute applies to make returns. [See 26 U.S.C. §6020(b)] (WTP #264)
7.71. Admit that Section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code states: (WTP #265)
"If any person fails to make any return required by an internal revenue law or regulation made there under at the time prescribed therefore, or makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the Secretary shall make such return from his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtain through testimony or otherwise." [See 26 U.S.C. 6020(b)]
7.72. Admit that nowhere in the Internal Revenue Code has Congress indicated that the word "shall" as used in Section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code has a different meaning than is used in Sections 6001, 6011, and/or 6012 of the Internal Revenue Code. [See Title 26, United States Code, in its entirety) (WTP #266)
7.73. Admit that in the absence of a Congressionally declared distinction for a word used in the same Code (here the Internal Revenue Code), in the same subtitle (here Subtitle F), in the same Chapter (here Chapter 61) and in the same Subchapter (here subchapter A) to be given a different meaning, the same word is to be given the same meaning. (WTP #267)
7.74. Admit that if an individual required to make a return under Section 6012(a) of the Internal Revenue Code fails to make the required return, the Secretary of the Treasury does not make the return mandated by Section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. (See Turner Affidavit, we are looking for a denial). (WTP #268)
7.75. Admit that the IRS computers system, the IDRS (Integrated Data Retrieval System) was programmed to require a tax return to be filed in order to create a tax module for each taxable year. (WTP #269)
7.76. Admit that if an individual required to make and file a return under Section 6012(a) fails to file such a return, that the Secretary creates a "dummy return" showing zero tax due and owing. [See Blair v. C.I.R., 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1396 (1989; Phillips v. C.I.R., 851 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Schiff v. United States, 71A A.F.T.R.2d 9303271 (1989)] (WTP #270)
7.77. Admit that this "dummy return" sets forth no financial data from which the gross income, adjusted gross income or taxable income can be computed. [See Blair v. C.I.R., 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1396 (1989; Phillips v. C.I.R., 851 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Schiff v. United States, 71A A.F.T.R.2d 9303271 (1989)] (WTP #271)
7.78. Admit that this "dummy return" is not signed. [See Blair v. C.I.R., 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1396 (1989; Phillips v. C.I.R., 851 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Schiff v. United States, 71A A.F.T.R.2d 9303271 (1989)] (WTP #272)
7.79. Admit that a "dummy return" is physically created on the IRS Form 1040. [See Blair v. C.I.R., 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1396 (1989; Phillips v. C.I.R., 851 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Schiff v. United States, 71A A.F.T.R.2d 9303271 (1989)] (WTP #273)
7.80. Admit that Congress has not authorized the Internal Revenue Code or Treasury Regulations that authorizes the creation of "dummy returns". (See Title 26, United States Code, in its entirety). (WTP #274)
7.81. Admit that if an individual required to make a return under 26 U.S.C. §6012(a) files a return that does not contain the financial information necessary to allow the IRS to compute gross income, adjusted gross income and/or taxable income, the IRS calls such a return a "zero return." (WTP #275)
7.82. Admit that if an individual required to make a return under Section 6012(a) files a return that does not contain the financial information necessary to allow the IRS to compute gross income, adjusted gross income and/or taxable income, the IRS takes the position that no return has been filed. (See Hopkins v. United States, 56 A.F.T.R.2d 85-5940 (1985); Nichols v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 320 (D.C. Minn. 1983); Tornichio v. United States, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 98-1377 (1988). (WTP #276)
7.83. Admit that if an individual required to make a return under Section 6012(a) files a return that does not contain the financial information necessary to allow the IRS to compute gross income, adjusted gross income and/or taxable income, the IRS takes the position that the return is "frivolous" and imposes a $500 penalty. (See Hopkins v. United States, 56 A.F.T.R.2d 85-5940 (1985); Nichols v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 320 (D.C. Minn. 1983); Tornichio v. United States, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 98-1377 (1988). (WTP #277)
7.84. Admit that if an individual required to make a return under Section 6012(a) files a return that does not contain a signature made under penalty of perjury, the IRS takes the position that no return was filed. (WTP #278)
7.85. Admit that if an individual required to make a return under Section 6012(a) files a return that does not contain a signature under penalties of perjury, the IRS takes the position that the return is "frivolous" and imposes a $500 penalty. (WTP #279)
7.86. Admit that an IMF record bearing the code "SFR 150" indicates that a fully paid IRS form 1040a was filed. [See LEM III 3(27)(68)0-34]. (WTP #280)